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Ownership Structures, Governance and Corporate Performance: 





The objective of this paper is to review the state of knowledge of the relationship 
between different corporate ownership structures and corporate performance. There 
exists a substantial literature which seeks to understand whether there is a 
relationship between governance structures and good governance observance (Denis 
and McConnell 2003). Denis and McConnell note that most early governance 
research appears in the Anglo-US dominated literature and focuses on issues of 
governance where ownership of individual corporations is widely dispersed, there 
exists a well developed and regulated market for corporate securities, and dominant- 
owner control of corporations is the exception. This pattern of ownership and 
control, however, is not to be found in much of Asia and, to a degree, in Europe 
(excluding UK and Ireland, Faccio and Lang 2002).  There is evidence that capital 
market conditions, historical development patterns or the level of development and 
enforcement of shareholder rights and corporate governance regulation result in 
patterns of ownership or control involving dominant stakeholders (dominant owner, 
financier) ( Claessens and Fan 2002; Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; Li et al. 
2006; Faccio and Lang 2002).  
 
In this paper we seek to establish how these alternative forms of ownership and 
control are related to the dominant theoretical literature on governance. This leads us 
to consider how various ownership structures are handled in agency theory and to 
outline the theoretical control and performance issues which result. We then turn to 
the empirical literature; we discuss the outcomes predicted by theory and then the 
measurement issues inherent in determining whether these outcomes are realised in 
practice. Within this discussion we consider ‘performance measurement’ issues in 
corporate performance. Finally we consider the existing empirical record on the 
relationship of different ownership structures and control structures to corporate 
performance. In conclusion we note that the literature is inconclusive in its 
assessment of the relationship between ownership and performance It is also 
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apparent that the empirical record to date has little to say about ownership structure 
and corporate performance in economies where capital markets, shareholder 
protections and legal enforcement are weak or underdeveloped. 
 
Agency Theory 
Berle and Means (1932), observing the USA early in the 20th century, noted that the 
dispersion of equity ownership had led to a transfer of corporate control from 
individual owners to professional managers in the joint-stock company. Berle and 
Means emphasised that when control is distinct from ownership, those in control 
may deploy assets in ways that benefit those in control rather than owners. As a 
result of their analysis, much of the literature on corporate governance assumes 
widely dispersed ownership and focuses on managing conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. 
 
Agency theory, (Jensen and Meckling 1976) derives from the separation between 
ownership and control in the modern stock issuing corporation. Such a separation, 
when coupled with the inability to completely specify contracts, will give the agents 
(managers) opportunities to pursue activities which will benefit themselves at the 
expense of their principals (owners). The basic premise is that ‘if both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximisers there is good reason to believe that the agent will 
not always act in the best interests of the principal’ (p. 308). Jensen and Meckling 
propose that the agent/principal divergence of interests causes agents to fail to 
maximise the welfare of the principal. This failure is the most important cost 
resulting from the principal and agent conflict and is known as the ‘agency 
problem’.  
 
Prasad (1990) argues that agency theory is a subset of organisation theories. Jensen 
(1988) considers that agency theory is derived from the nexus of contracts view of 
the organisation. From this view, agency theory perceives the firm as a nexus of 
contracts between different parties, known as the firm’s stakeholders. This theory 
assumes the contracts to be incomplete in nature, not fully specifying and not able to 
specify completely, the parties’ obligations for every conceivable contingency 
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(Berglof 1990)1. This incomplete specification is the grounds for conflicts of interest 
among the parties involved. To overcome the potential conflicts, there has evolved a 
system of internally and externally mediated rights, structures, processes and  
guidelines, or ‘corporate governance’, relating to how the firm should be governed 
and directed in order to achieve the firm’s goals. Lannoo (1995) defines corporate 
governance as ‘…the whole system of rights, processes and controls established 
internally and externally over the management of a business entity’.  Monks and 
Minow (1995) argue that corporate governance addresses the challenge of ‘how to 
grant managers enormous discretionary power over the conduct of the business 
while holding them accountable for that power.’ 
 
The ‘agency problem’ engenders the need to monitor the actions of management and 
to have in place control mechanisms to align the interests of principals and agents. 
However, monitoring mechanisms are not without costs. Monitoring or agency costs 
will be borne by the principals as the capital owners in this relationship. The owners 
have the incentive to ensure that managers do not diverge from the goal to maximise 
shareholder value. However, as rational entrepreneurs, owners have to consider the 
cost and benefits of monitoring mechanisms that they choose to oversee 
management. Agency theory seeks to define the nature of contracts that will 
minimise agency costs; that is the costs of monitoring, motivating and ensuring the 
commitment of the agent (Davis and Thompson 1994). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue, in their convergence-of-interest hypothesis, that 
corporate performance will increase with the level of management or insider 
ownership in a company. On the other hand, Demsetz (1983), within a similar 
theoretical framework, has argued that the increased level of insider ownership will 
reduce corporate performance. This argument is known as the entrenchment 
hypothesis. Studies by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnel and 
Servaes (1990; 1995) support the view that increased managerial ownership 
adversely impacts a firm’s value over certain ownership ranges. Proponents of this 
 
1 Consequently, these contracts include not only the explicit legal contract, in which the terms are 
clearly specified (e.g. employment contracts), but also long term relationships built on implicit 
contracts of shared understandings (Boatright 2002) 
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hypothesis suggest that providing managers with share ownership to align their 
interests with the owners may not effectively solve the agency problems.  
 
The Agency Problem and Ownership Structure  
The pattern of ownership concentration and composition will determine which party 
has the dominant power in the organisation (Jensen and Warner 1988). Observation 
of a company’s ownership structure provides one basis for identifying the 
distribution of power among interested parties in an organisation.  
 
Recent literature brings into question the assumption of widely dispersed ownership 
and suggests that perhaps the more fundamental conflict of interest is between 
majority and minority shareholders. After the mid-20th century the ownership 
concentration in more developed economies with strong capital markets has shifted 
into the hands of financial institutions, such as pension or mutual funds (Hawley and 
Williams 1997; Li et al 2006). Li et al. (2006, 2982), with a sample of 45 countries, 
find that the mean level of institutional blockholding is 9.7% of issued shares and 
the proportion of firms with at least one institutional holder is 47.6%. They find that 
large shareholding by institutions is more prevalent among ‘widely-held’ rather than 
closely (or family-held) firms. Studies by Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Nenova 
(2003) have gone on to study the private ‘benefits’ to block-holding shareowners. 
 
 La Porta et al. (1998) studied a sample of large non-financial firms from 49 
countries and found that average ownership by three largest shareholders was 46 
percent. A study by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) revealed that 
within a range of countries control is often concentrated within a family who are 
often the founder of the firm or their descendants. Studies by Zingales (1994), Kunz 
and Angel (1996), Rydqvist (1996), Taylor and Whittred (1998), Nicodano (1998), 
Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), and Faccio and Lang (2002) document 
concentrated family ownership by families in Europe, Canada, and Australia. 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) examined nine East Asian countries and also 
found a predominance of family control and family management. According to La 
Porta et al. (2000) the important implication of this evidence for the study of 
corporate governance is the relative irrelevance of the Berle and Means framework 
in most countries in the world and the centrality of family control. 
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Pyramidal- and cross-ownership are two types of ownership and control patterns that 
permit controlling shareholders to control corporations (Wiwattanakantang 2001). 
Pyramidal ownership allows the controlling corporations to exercise power in a 
group via layers of companies through a chain of ownership relations. Spreading 
their investment over a large number of firms and concentrating those of the 
entrepreneur at the top of the pyramid allows the entrepreneur to control a larger set 
of assets of various companies (Bianco and Casavola 1999). La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) reveal that the pyramid structure is very common in a 
sample of the twenty largest firms in each of twenty-seven wealthy countries 
studied. They found that 26 percent of the firms that have controlling shareholders 
are controlled through a pyramid structure. A study by Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
(2000) found that corporate control is enhanced through pyramid structures and 
cross-holdings among firms in nine East Asian countries.  In the case of Indonesia, 
‘pyramidal ownership structure with ultimate owners is more prominent where 
family holding is high and in a number of cases one family owned several publicly 
listed companies’ (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000, 92). The main agency 
problem within this type of ownership arises from conflict between relatively 
“strong” block shareholders and “weak” minority owners.  
 
Cross-shareholding ownership occurs when a company further down the chain of 
control has some shares in another company in the same business line. This 
mechanism not only will assume effective control for block shareholders, but also 
protects the power of the controlling shareholders. Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
(2000) argue that this type of ownership is also part of the pyramidal structure. This 
can be used to insulate the controlling shareholders from being monitored by any 
corporate governance mechanisms (Wiwattanakantang 2001).  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) believe that the dominant agency problem around the 
world is the conflict between outside investors and controlling shareholders who 
have almost full control over managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that this 
problem may also arise between shareholders and creditors, and between 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Therefore, the type of ownership structure may 
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be the most important factor in shaping the corporate governance system of any 
country (Aoki 1995).  
 
Within the corporate governance context, the key aspects of corporate ownership are 
its concentration and composition (ADB 2000). The degree of concentration 
determines the distribution of power within a company, whether it is dispersed or 
concentrated. The structure and concentration of shareholding are two elements that 
may limit the role of the corporate control (Lannoo 1999).  When ownership is 
dispersed, shareholder control tends to be weak because of poor shareholder 
monitoring due to the ‘free-rider’ problem (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
1999).  
 
By contrast, when a concentrated ownership exists, large shareholders have the 
incentives and resources to monitor management decisions and reduce agency costs  
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986). This is particularly relevant to the family-based 
ownership that exercises corporate control through pyramidal ownership and high 
involvement of family members appointed to the board or management team.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) view concentrated ownership from the position of the 
effectiveness of law and regulations in protecting property rights. They suggest that 
the benefits from family based concentrated ownership are relatively larger in 
countries that are generally less developed, where property rights are not well 
defined and/or protected by the judicial system. Li et al. (2006) argue that their 
results suggest that large institutional block-holdings are significantly less prevalent 
in countries with weak macro governance characteristics (shareholder rights, legal 
enforcement, financial disclosure) and where they do invest in such countries they 
will seek a large, perhaps controlling interest.  
 
The forgoing discussion of the implications of concentrated rather than dispersed 
share-ownership makes it clear that different agency problems arise when there is 
little separation of ownership and control, with equity ownership concentrated in the 
hands of inside owners (Lins and Servaes 1999). As a consequence, the agency 
problem has shifted from the traditional manager-shareholders relationship to the 
conflict between ‘majority and minority shareholders’.  
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Corporate Governance and Control Mechanisms 
Central to the study of the effects of ownership structure and firm performance is the 
concept and definition of ‘control’ (Short 1994). Fama and Jensen (1983) consider a 
firm’s decision process, namely initiation, ratification, implementation, and 
monitoring, in defining the concept of control. They argue that ‘an effective system 
for decision control implies, almost by definition, that the control (ratification and 
monitoring) of decisions is to some extent separate from the management (initiation 
and implementation) of decisions’ (p. 304). Within this context, control refers to the 
ability of a particular individual or group to dominate the decision making process 
within a firm.  
 
Most early empirical studies differentiate between owner-controlled firms and 
management-controlled firms. Firms are generally classified as being owner-
controlled if a dominant shareholding interest owns a specified fraction of the firm. 
On the other hand, if the shareholding interests are so diverse that no single interest 
or coalition of interests can effectively control the firm (Short 1994), it should be 
classified as the management-controlled firm. Furthermore, she claims that most 
researchers utilise the percentage of ownership as the criterion to differentiate the 
ownership type of a firm. Short (1994, 216) argues that there is ‘little consensus with 
regard to the central issue: at what level of ownership and within which type of 
ownership structure is there effective control of the firm’. This argument is based on 
the use of different definitions of control as implied by different cut-off points of 
ownership in each study.  
 
McEachern (1975) argues that owner-controlled firms can be classified further into 
two groups: outside owners who were not actively involved in management 
(externally controlled firm) and owners who were also managers (owner managed 
firms). This classification is based on the argument that controlling shareholders 
who were also managers had different incentives from those shareholders external to 
the firm. In his study of 48 large US firms, McEachern (1975) demonstrated a 
significant difference in firm performance between these types of ownership. 
 
Cubbin and Leech (1983) raised two important dimensions in regard to the 
separation of ownership and control: the location of control (internal or external) and 
 9
the degree of control (measured by the voting power exercised by the controlling 
group of shareholders). They believe that the degree of control is dependent on the 
location of control, as owner-managed firms exhibit a higher degree of control for 
any given level of shareholding than external-controlled firms.  
 
Faccio and Lang (2002), in their study of ultimate ownership of corporations in 
Western Europe, consider two measures of ownership, cash-flow rights, 
representative of the ultimate ownership stake and control rights, the percentage of 
voting rights ultimately accruing to controlling shareholders. While their study does 
not set out to consider effective exercise of control they do note that approximately 
two-thirds of family controlled Western European firms have top managers from 
controlling families.  
 
Moerland (1995) proposes ownership structures are a central distinguishing feature 
of financial systems. Distinctions between different financial systems may help 
explain differences in ownership and control structures. Berglof (1990) 
differentiated financial systems as market or bank-oriented, based on the pattern of 
capital mobilization used by companies to finance their operations. In Anglo-Saxon 
countries, for example, ownership concentration is low (Charkham 1995; Faccio and 
Lang 2002) and companies have access to stock markets for equity capital raisings. 
By contrast, concentrated ownership is a salient feature in some countries in 
Continental Europe (Moerland 1995; Faccio and Lang 2002) and in East Asia (ADB 
2000). In these countries, corporate financing through bank loans and other non-
equity sources remain more dominant.  
 
On the other hand, research suggests that financial structures alone are not 
explanatory and indeed the pattern of financing may be an outcome of conditions 
leading to different ownership and control regimes rather than the cause, meaning 
that ownership structure should be treated as endogenous rather than exogenous. A 
number of recent studies have modelled this approach (Al Farooque et al. 2007; 
Nenova 2003).  Nenova (2003), for example, in her cross-country analysis of the 
value of corporate voting rights and control concludes that the legal environment, 
degree of law enforcement, investor protection provisions, takeover regulations and 
power concentrating corporate charter provisions overall explain 68 percent of the 
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value of control-block votes. This finding suggests rational response to differences 
in these conditions resulting in either compensating or exploitative incentives to 
block control .Dyck and Zingales (2004) also conclude that higher private benefits 
of control are associated with less developed capital markets.  La Porta et al. (2000) 
and Li et al.(2006) support the position that the degree of investor protection and the 
legal environment are critical to governance processes. Shleifer and Wolfenson 
(2002) relate this to the degree of development of equity markets.   
 
Internal Mechanisms of Corporate Control 
Corporate control exercised may be either internal or external to the corporation. As 
external control, ‘the market for corporate control’ refers to the control function 
provided by market competition as an instrument in disciplining management 
behaviour. Agency theory’s approach to external control assumes the efficient 
operation of capital markets; for corporations listed on the stock exchange then, the 
value of residual claims held by shareholders is reflected in the company’s share 
price on the stock market. The efficient capital market serves as a mechanism to 
discipline a company’s governance performance as it is reflected in a share price. 
Within this mechanism are included the capital market, the product market, and the 
managerial labour market (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). The ‘market for 
corporate control’ is considered to be active in market economies characterized by a 
relatively well-developed capital market and low ownership concentration (Aoki 
1995) and where a relatively dispersed share-ownership exists. 
 
 As we have noted above, there is evidence that to a considerable degree in Europe 
and in Asia the conditions for an active ‘market for corporate control’, namely a 
well-developed capital market and low ownership concentration, do not exist. 
Further, we have noted the growing phenomenon of institutional block-shareholding 
across many jurisdictions. 
 
The study by ADB (2000) in East Asian countries found that the market for 
corporate control has been largely inactive in this region. Sarkar, Sarkar and 
Bhaumik (1998) argue that the link between the market for corporate control and 
firm performance in developing countries can be weak for several reasons including 
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limitations on the amount of company information and high transaction costs 
associated with a takeover.  
  
In the absence of a well functioning external market for control internal control 
mechanisms  ‘provide an early warning system to put the organisation back on track 
before difficulties reach a crisis stage’ (Jensen 2000, p.49). The board of directors at 
the apex of the internal corporate governance control system has the final 
responsibility for the functioning of the firm. The board of directors can act to 
restrict potential conflicts on interests between managers and shareholders. Van den 
Berghe and De Ridder (1999) argue this can possibly be best achieved if directors 
are independent of management and have appropriate knowledge of the firm. 
 
In a two-tier board system, as commonly found in continental European countries, a 
company’s board structure consists of an executive board and a supervisory board. 
Within this system, executive boards coincide with the top-level management team, 
while the supervisory board is completely composed of outside experts with a 
broader control function than in Anglo Saxon countries (Moerland 1995).  In 
principle this type of board system leads to a formal separation of supervisory and 
executive responsibilities. 
 
Agency theorists propose managerial incentive schemes may be used by boards 
(Rindova 1999) as an internal to the firm instrument for resolving agency problem 
through the ‘incentive alignment solutions’. The basic argument is that ‘management 
should be more willing to act to maximise shareholder value if doing so provides 
management with greater reward as well’ (Denis 2001, 201).  
 
Dharwadkar, George and Brandes (2000) argue there are significant differences in 
agency problems between different governance contexts. They suggest that the 
agency problem in countries with relatively strong governance structures should be 
resolved differently from those of countries with relatively weak governance 
structures such as those prevalent in emerging economies. Therefore, Dharwadkar, 
George and Brandes (2000) distinguished between “traditional” agency problems, 
which are common in developed economies, as opposed to “unique” agency 
problems, which they posit exist in emerging economies. 
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The “unique” agency problem in emerging and developing countries is characterised 
by the expropriation of minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000). Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988) propose that the expropriation problem occurs within a weak 
governance context when large or majority owners assume control of the firm and 
deprive minority owners of their rights. A study by Husnan (2001) suggests that 
most East Asian corporations have the majority of their shares held by the founding 
owner. Moreover, this study also found that these countries have relatively small and 
not-well developed capital markets. There is also evidence that one means whereby 
the controlling owner retains majority control is through selling small amounts of a 
company’s equity (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000). As such, the market for 
corporate control will work differently in such countries.  
 
There are arguments that ownership concentration can be both a complement to and 
a substitute for shareholder protection in countries with poor legal protections. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that ownership concentration can be a substitute 
for legal protection because large owners perform the monitoring function. Burkart 
and Panunzi (2001) claim that outside block ownership is an optimal substitute for 
legal shareholder protection when the law is of intermediate quality, while it acts as 
a complement when the law is poor. On the other hand, Li et al. (2006) demonstrate 
that poor shareholder protection may deter institutional investors from taking a large 
stake unless it is a controlling stake. 
 
There are several arguments advanced in support of the appointment of owners’ 
related family members to the management or board of a company. McConaughy et 
al. (1998), for example indicate that family relationships improved monitoring and 
provided incentives that are associated with better firm performance. Family 
members are assumed to have a special interest in the firm’s success, given that the 
firm represents the legacy of its founder and the social status of the family is likely 
to be tied to a firm’s performance. The “reputation effect” of this relationship could 
prevent social sanctions against the family, so it might have a positive impact on 
firm performance (Kets de Vries 1993). In addition, given the long-standing 
relationship between the family and a company, it could provide the appointed 
family members with excellent knowledge of the firm (Smith and Amoako-Adu 
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1999; McConaughy, Matthews and Fialko 2001). From this view, owners’ 
involvement in the board and/or management team might complement other 
disciplinary mechanisms and enhance performance. 
 
Performance Measurement 
The purpose of corporate governance is to monitor and improve firm performance 
(Borsch-Supan and Koke 2002). While there is acceptance of firm performance as a 
multidimensional construct (Peng and Luo 2000) there is disagreement as to what 
criteria and indicators of performance should be employed (Dalton et al. 1980; Ford 
and Schellenberg 1982). Hannan and Freeman (1977) argue that the disagreement in 
regard to organisational performance is so intense that some have questioned the 
usefulness of studying performance at all.  
 
Performance measurement systems have historically developed as a means of 
monitoring and maintaining organisational control in order to ensure the 
achievement of organisational goals and objectives (Brignall and Ballantine 1996; 
Ghalayani and Noble 1996). An appropriate performance measurement system 
should enable organisations to monitor the implementation of plans, determine how 
successful these plans are, and how to improve them.  
 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986, 803) differentiate three domains in the 
performance measurement concept as (a) domain of financial performance, (b) 
domain of financial and non-financial (operational) performance, as a broader 
conceptualisation of business performance, and (c) domain of organisational 
effectiveness. 
  
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) argue that most of the studies utilising 
performance measurement have restricted their focus to the first two domains. They 
believe that this tendency is due to the availability of data and the implications of 
that for operationalisation. Kald and Nilsson (2000) argue that difficulties in using 
performance measures other than the financial lie in translating programs and 
activities to be measurable.  
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Early models of performance measurement focused solely on financial-accounting 
measures, an extension of the company’s financial reporting systems (Atkinson, 
Waterhouse and Wells 1997). Such measures, for example ‘Return On Investment’ 
(ROI), are widely regarded as the most useful measures and the ultimate bottom line 
of business performance. However, this has been claimed as traditional and of little 
help in measuring performance in the new competitive environment (Chow, Haddad 
and Williamson 1997). 
 
Several performance measurement models have been developed that could be 
considered as improvements on the traditional financial models. These models are 
finance related and take the position that business processes’ ultimate success can be 
viewed through focussing on financial performance measures. Among these models 
are the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1996), the Economic Value Added 
(Stern, Shiely and Ross 2001) and the Strategic Performance Measurement 
(Waterhouse and Svendsen 1998) models. All of them retain financial performance 
measures and use additional indicators that are non-financial, or they utilise 
operational performance measures as complementary.  
 
Sloan (2001) argues that accounting data serves as an important source of 
information for governance mechanisms that help alleviate the agency problems 
faced by a company. Sloan (2001) believes that accounting information is required 
for most governance mechanisms to operate efficiently. Although accounting 
information is useful and important in corporate governance studies, not all of the 
agency costs are reflected in the accounting measures (Wiwattanakantang 2001). 
This limitation has led researchers to utilise information based on the market 
indicators of performance, such as stock prices in measures such as Tobin’s Q. For 
example, Bacidore et al. (1997, 14) argue that the financial performance 
measurement through the firm’s stock price is appropriate in measuring shareholder 
wealth creation by determining ‘how much shareholders increase their wealth from 
one period to the next based on the dividends they receive and the appreciation in 
the firm’s stock price’.  
 
The issue of the use of the accounting profit rate and/or Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
firm’s performance is important for the study of the ownership/performance 
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relationship. These two measures differ from each other in two aspects (Demsetz 
and Villalonga 2001, 213). Firstly, the time perspective: accounting profit is 
backward-looking, while Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking measure of performance. 
Accounting profit rates are affected by accounting practices and emphasise what 
management has accomplished. Tobin’s Q, on the other hand, reflects the value 
investors assign to a firm’s intangible assets based on predicted future revenue 
stream. 
 
A second distinction is in regard to who is measuring performance. The accounting 
profit rate measurement is done by the accountant, constrained by standards set by 
his/her profession. Tobin’s Q measures are used in common by the community of 
investors constrained by their perceptions (i.e. optimism, pessimism). Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) believe that this later measure is preferred by economists. 
However, they further argue that Tobin’s Q measurement is affected by the 
psychology of investors, as it will also include the prospects and the outcomes of 
present business strategies. 
 
The two measures are interrelated. According to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, 
213) the investor community who developed Tobin’s Q measurement do not ‘ignore 
the past in their attempts to determine reasonable expectations for the future 
profitability of firms’. The reason is that ‘high accounting profits are usually 
accompanied by high stock prices’ (p.214). The use of the market value of the firm 
as a numerator of Tobin’s Q to some significant degree reflects accounting profit 
rates.  
 
Gugler and Yurtogula (2003, 380) argue that average measures of performance such 
as Tobin’s Q ‘confound intramarginal and marginal returns’ , and in particular are 
not suitable for exploring the agency aspects of managerial behaviour. They further 
argue that the use of average performance measures requires a fully specified 
structural model, one not available in this research. They suggest ‘marginal Tobin’s 
Q, or qm, the ratio of the firm’s returns on its investment to its costs of capital.        
Bjuggren, Eklund and Wiberg (2005) have used marginal Tobin’s Q in a recent 
study involving vote-differentiated shares in Sweden. 
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In order to use market indicators to measure performance, it must be assumed that 
stock prices reflect the true value of the firm (Lindenberg and Ross 1981). It is 
possible that market indicators that represent the true value of a firm can only be 
found in fully developed capital markets. Khanna and Palepu (1999) argue that this 
assumption may not be met in the case of emerging economies. 
Research has found both accounting and market-based performance measures to be 
related to the corporate governance decisions, as in the case of CEO compensation 
(Engel, Gordon and Hayes 2002). The use of accounting measures may not be 
accurate in this case because this measure is subject to manipulation by management 
(Wiwattanakantang 2001). On the other hand, a market-based measure may not be 
‘an efficient contracting parameter because it is driven by many factors beyond the 
control of the firm’s executives’ (Bacidore et al. 1997, 11).  
Another relevant issue in regard to performance measures is the appropriateness of 
one measure in different institutional contexts. Claessens and Djankov (1999, 502) 
argue that in a country with weak minority shareholder protections, the use of stock 
market performance may lead to a ‘downward bias in the relationship between 
ownership and firm’s valuation’. Similar problems also exist for accounting data, 
since data quality relies heavily on the quality of accounting standards (Claessens 
and Djankov 1999b). Based on the firms’ objective of maximising shareholder 
wealth, the performance measurement chosen should be able to measure shareholder 
wealth creation (Bacidore et al. 1997). Different environmental and contextual 
settings must be considered in the choice of performance measurement, particularly 
in cross-country studies.  
 
The Ownership-Performance Relationship 
There is a growing body of research in the economics and management literature 
that seeks to identify whether there is a link between the structure of stock 
ownership, managerial behaviour and corporate performance. Most of the early 
research has focused on corporations with diffused ownership within the framework 
of the conventional Anglo-Saxon model of corporate control.  
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One of the most commonly investigated empirical problems has been the 
relationship between types of ownership and organisational performance (Leblebici 
and Feigenbaum 1986). Craswell, Taylor and Saywell (1997) note that different 
points of view find support in the mixed results of existing empirical research, 
almost all of which is US-based (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1988; McConnel and Servaes 1990). 
 
Research on optimal ownership structures relating to the levels of private benefits 
and controls (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1988) has extended beyond the Anglo-Saxon 
environment. This research, although also still mainly at the level of theoretical 
debate, is especially important for countries with relatively high concentrated 
ownership. Many of these countries have been identified as having relatively low 
protection of minority shareholders, allowing expropriation of minority shareholders 
by the controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). These expropriations 
take various forms, such as related parties transactions, asset stripping and other 
forms of transferring of revenue and assets between firms (e.g. Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1988; La Porta et al. 2000). In this environment agency conflicts have been 
identified as the expropriation of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
La Porta et al 2000). However, the expropriation by controlling owners is 
constrained by their financial incentives (Filatotchev et al. 2001). 
 
 Krishnamurti, Sevic and Sevic (2005), in a post-crisis study of larger East Asian 
corporations report no strong evidence of expropriation in Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand, a finding at variance with Claessen et al. (1999, 2002) and Lemmon and 
Lins (2003). It is noted that Claessen’s results include small as well as large 
corporations while Lemmon and Lins focus on the disruption of the Asian crisis.   
La Porta et al. (2000) show that countries with poor investor protection typically 
exhibit more ownership concentration than do countries with good investor 
protection and they argue that the choice of concentrated ownership, other things 
being equal, should lead to lower expropriation.  
 
A number of studies provide empirical evidence of the relationship between 
corporate ownership pattern and firm’s performance. A study by La Porta et al. 
(2000) of the largest quoted firms from 27 countries found that higher cash flow 
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ownership was associated with higher corporate valuation. This study also revealed 
that such an effect was greater in countries with weak or inferior investor protection. 
Using a data-set of 2,658 companies listed in East Asian countries, Claessens et al. 
(1999) documented that high cash flow rights in the hands of large-block holders 
were positively related to corporate valuation.  
 
The most researched topics in this literature are the effect of the owner’s stake on 
performance (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988; Bjuggren 
et al. 2007; Filatotchev, Lien and Piesse 2005), the optimal bundling of cash flow 
and control rights (Grossman and Hart 1988; Harris and Raviv 1988), the costs and 
benefits of a single large controlling shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; 
Burkart, Gomb and Panunzi 1997), and of several large shareholders (Pagano and 
Roell 1998) and of group affiliation (Chang and Hong 2000). Until recently 
empirical research in this area has mostly been limited to studies based on data from 
developed economies.  
 
A study conducted by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) presents conflicting 
results about the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. A study 
by Holderness and Sheehan (1988) using both ROE and Tobin’s Q as performance 
measures, found no significant difference between majority held shareholding by a 
single individual or entity and diffusedly held shareholding. Murali and Welch 
(1989), comparing closely held firms and widely held firms, obtained similar results 
using purely accounting profit rates as a measure of performance. 
 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) looking at 435 firms in 12 European Union countries, 
found a significant relationship between concentrated ownership, shareholding by 
institutional investors and accounting profit. Wiwattanakantang (2001) found that 
the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher firm performance.  
Further, this study reveals that family-controlled firms have significantly higher 
performance relative to firms with no controlling shareholder, as measured by return 
on assets and the simplified Tobin’s Q. 
 
It should be pointed out that temporal variations as well as nation-specific factors are 
expected to influence the ownership-performance relationship. Lemmon and Lins 
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(2003), for example, found that cumulative stock returns (measured as ‘buy and 
hold’ return ) during the Asian Crisis were 12 percent lower for those East Asian 
corporations with  pyramidal structures which allowed managers and owners to 
separate their control and cash flow rights.  
 
A meta-analysis with focus on the impact of institutional owners in the USA 
(Sundaramurthy, Rhoades and Rechner 2005) found no significant association 
between institutional ownership and financial performance. The finding of no 
significant relationship held when tested for moderating variables such as non-linear 
executive ownership variables. The broader meta-analysis of Sanchez-Ballesta and 
Garcia-Meca (2007), covering 33 studies from both European and Anglo-Saxon 
countries found no significant relationship overall between ownership concentration 
and firm performance. They found, however, moderating influences based on sub-
group analysis relating to the particular governance system (continental system or 
Anglo-Saxon), the measurement of performance used and controls for edogeneity. 
  
Research utilising the agency theory perspective assumes that ownership features 
influence corporate behaviour and performance. However, as has been argued by 
Jensen (1983), variations in capital markets, product and factor markets, internal 
control systems and political, legal and regulatory systems have influenced agency 
costs arising from differential ownership structures.  Given various measurements of 
both ownership and performance variables and different institutional environments, 
it is expected that the outcome will also vary.  Debreu (1959) notes ‘performance, in 
whatever form constructed, is itself a noisy dependent variable’.  
 
The literature on the ownership-performance relationship has the basic proposition 
that different patterns of ownership structure lead to different impacts on firm 
performance. Early empirical evidence referred almost exclusively to Anglo-Saxon 
firms (Lehmann and Weigand 2000). Later studies have focussed more widely, with 
a number of studies focussing on East Asia in particular (Tam and Tan 2007; 
Filatotchev, Lien and Piesse 2005; Cho and Kim 2007). Studies are summarised in 
Table 1. The results are somewhat mixed, due to the wide variation in measures of 
performance and ownership. The conflicting results may also be attributable to the 
underlying model used in the studies. Later studies (Cho and Kim 2007; Al 
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Farooque 2007; Filatotchev, Lien and Piesse 2005) have considered models 
involving both endogeneity of ownership structure and non-linear relationships. 
 
Studies using ownership structure measures can be categorised into four groups; (1) 
emphasis on managerial versus owners’ control of shareholding (e.g. Kamerschen 
1968; Thonet and Poensgen 1979; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 2007), (2) emphasis 
on majority versus diffusedly held ownership (e.g. Holderness and Sheehan 1988; 
Murali and Welch 1989 ), (3) measure of ownership owned by directors and/or 
officers (e.g. Lloyd, Jahera and Goldstein 1986; Kim, Lee and Francis 1988; Braun 
and Sharma 2007), and (4) combination of ownership measures (e.g. McConnel and 
Servaes 1990, 1995; Han, Lee and Suk 1999; Bjuggren, Eklund and Wiberg 2007). 
 
The use of some categorisations of ownership measures has been criticised by 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) as putting together shareholdings owned by persons 
with different interests. In particular they note where managers and directors are not 
separately distinguished these two groups may have conflicting interests. They 
contend that the fractions of shares owned by outside shareholders (including 
directors) and by management should be measured separately for their impact on 




Table 1: Effect of Ownership and Control on Firm Performance – A Summary of the Empirical Findings 
 
Author(s)  Sample and 
Period 
Ownership Variable(s) Performance Variable(s) Main Results 
Kamerschen  
(1968)  
47 large US 
firms  
(1959-1964) 
a. Management control (MC) ≤ 10% 
single block of voting control 
b. Owner controlled  (OC) ≥ 10% 
c. Dummy for change in control from 
1929 to 1963 
 
- Return on equity No significant difference 
between MC and OC firms, 
but significant positive 
relationship between ROE 
and change in control 




82 U.K. firms  
(1967-1971) 
a. Owner control (OC) ≥ 15% of cohesive 
group or ≥ 3% ownership by managers  
b. Management control (MC) otherwise 
- Return on equity 
- Return on assets 
- Return on sales 
OC firms are significantly 
more profitable (weak) than 
MC firms for all measure of 
performance 
 
Thonet and  
Poensgen  
(1979) 
62 large German 
Industrial firms 
(1961-1970) 
a. Management control (MC) ≤ 25% of 
cohesive stock ownership 
b. Owner control (OC) ≥ 25% of cohesive 
stock ownership and no other part with 
25% of cohesive stock ownership 
- Return on equity (ROE) 
- Stocks return assuming 
dividends are reinvested 
(SR) 
- Market value to book 
value (MBV) 
- Growth of Total Assets 
OC firms are significantly 
less profitable than MC firms 
(for ROE and MBV), and no 
significance difference 
between OC and MC for SR. 
OC firms have greater growth 





150 large US 
firms 
(1960-1967) 
a. Management control (MC) ≤ 10% 
single block of common stock 
b. Weak owner control (WOC) > 30% > 
10% 
c. Strong owner control (SOC) ≥ 30% 
d. All owner control (AOC) = WOC+SOC 
 
- A risk adjusted return on 
sales (RARS) 
- Return on equity (ROE) 
WOC and AOC firms with a 
large degree of monopoly 
significantly more profitable 




Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Author(s)  Sample and  
 Period 
Ownership Variable(s) Performance Variable(s) Main Results 
Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) 
 




a. A5 – percentage of equity owned by 5 
largest shareholders 
b. A20- percentage of equity owned by 20 
largest shareholders 
c. AH- approximation of Herfindal 
measure of ownership concentration 
 
Accounting rate of return 
(average annual net 
income/book value of 
shareholders equity) 
No significant relationship 
between ownership 
concentration and accounting 
rate of return 






779 US firms 
(1978-1981) 
 
a. Percentage of shareholdings by officers 
and directors (manager controlled) 
b. Percentage of shareholding by largest 
shareholder (voted as a block) and 
owner controlled 
 
Monthly common stock 
returns 
No significant relationship 
between ownership and return 




157 US firms 
(1975-1978) 
Stockholdings of officers and directors 
(insider ownership); 
d. Lowest quartile 
e. Second quartile 
f. Third quartile 
g. Highest quartile 
 
- Market value of 
outstanding equity shares 
- Price earnings ratio 
(equivalent EPS ratio) 
The firms with high insider 
ownership outperform low 





101 majority held 
and 101 diffusely 
held large US 
listed firms 
(1979-1984) 
a. 95%> majority held > 50.1% ownership 
by single individual or entity (other 
corporation or fund) 
b. Diffusely held < 20% ownership by any 
shareholder 
 
- Tobin’s Q by firm’s 
market value to 
replacement cost of plants 
and inventories 
- Return on equity 
Finds no significant 
difference in performance 
between majority held and 
diffusely held firms 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Author(s)  Sample and  
Period 
Ownership Variable(s) Performance Variable(s) Main Results 




371 large US 
firms  
(1980) 
a. Combined shareholding by all members 
of the board in the ranges (0-5%), (5-
25%) and (25-100%) 
b. Combined shareholding by top two 
officers 
c. Dummy for presence of founder 
- Tobin’s Q by market 
value of stock, preferred 
stock and debt to 
replacement cost of plant 
and inventories 
- Profit rate by net cash 
flow to replacement cost 
of capital 
Profitability is significantly 
increased for board 
membership in the (0-5%) 
and significantly decreased in 
the (5-25%) and if founder is 
present in the board of old 
firms. Similar results for top 
two officers. 
 





43 closely held 
and 83 widely 
held US firms 
(1977-1981) 
a. Closely held firms > 50% by small 
group or individual 
b. Widely held firms, all other firms 
- Adjusted stock market 
return 
- Return on assets 
- Return on equity 
No significant difference in 
performance between closely 
held and widely held firms 









US firms listed 
on NYSE or 
AMEX  
1976 and 1986 
a. Insider stock ownership by managers 
and directors 
b. Institutional ownership 
c. Blockholders as combined ownership 
by non-insiders who have more than 
5% ownership 
d. Largest single blockholders 
e. Dummy for presence of blockholders 
f. Insiders plus blockholders 
g. Insider ownership in range (0-5%), (5-
25%) and (25-100%) 
h. Insider plus all blockholders in the 
ranges (0-5%), (5-25%) and (25-100%) 
 
- Tobin’s Q by market 
value of stock, preferred 
stock and debt to 
replacement value of 
assets 
- Return on assets by 
earnings before 
depreciation, interest and 
taxes divided by 
replacement value of 
assets 
Both measures of profitability 
significantly increasing with 
ownership by managers and 
directors (similar result for 
insider plus all blockholders).  
Performance increased 
significantly with institutional 
ownership. No measure of 
blockholder ownership seems 




Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Author(s)  Sample and 
Period 





134 US firms 




Combined stock ownership by present 
CEO and all former CEOs still in the board 
in the ranges 
a. 0% -1% 
b. 1% -5% 
c. 5%-20% 
d. 20%-100% 
Tobin’s Q by ; market value 
of stock, preferred stock 
and debt to market value of 
capital stock, inventories 
and other assets 
Return on assets by EBIT 




significantly with the CEO 
ownership in the (a) range 
and decreased significantly in 
(b) range. Otherwise the 
different regressions present 
insignificant or contradicting 
evidence 
Denis and Denis 
(1994) 
 
72 US firms 





a. Majority ownership ≥ 50% insider 
ownership by managers and directors 
b. Institutional ownerships 
c. Dummy for outside blockholder    
    ownership 
d. Dummy for family and founder 
involvement in management or BOD 
 
- Return on equity 
- Return on assets 
- Operating income to 
assets 
- Tobin’s Q 
- Market to book ratio 
No difference in performance 
between majority-controlled 
firms and other firms. The 
likelihood of majority control 
increases significantly with 
family/founder involvement 




US firms listed 





a. Insider stock ownership by managers 
and directors 
b. Institutional ownership 
c. Blockholders as combined ownership 
by non-insiders who have more than 
5% ownership 
 
Tobin’s Q by market value 
of stock, preferred stock 
and debt to replacement 
value of assets 
Similar result with previous 
study (1990), except 
Tobin’s Q is significantly 








Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Author(s)  Sample and 
 Period 
Ownership Variable(s) Performance Variable(s) Main Results 
Himmelberg,  
Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) 
 
Small and large 
US firms;  
398 (1982) 
 425 (1983) 
427 (1984) 
a. Percentage of common equity holdings 
by all top-level managers (the value is 
transformed using log(m/m-1)) 
b. Average percentage of equity ownership 
per top-level managers (using log of this 
value) 
- Tobin’s Q by market 
value of stock + 
estimated market value of 
preferred stock + book 
value of total liabilities to 
book value of total assets 
- Return on Total Assets 
Find some evidence of roof- 
shaped relation. After 
controlling for firm 
characteristics and firm fixed 
effects, there is no relation 
between managerial 
ownership and performance 
 
Holderness, 








120 large firms 
in 1935 and 
1995 
a. Percentage  and dollar ownership by the 
firm’s officers and director both directly 
and indirectly 
b. Percentage and dollar ownership by CEO 
(MO) 
c. Combined shareholding by officers and 
directors in the ranges (0-5%), (5-25%) 
and (25-100%) 
Tobin’s Q by market value 
of stock, book value of debt 
to book value of assets 
Profitability is significantly 
increasing for MO in the (0-
5%) range and significantly 
decreasing in the (5-25%) 
range for 1935 sample. For 
the 1995 sample Tobin’s Q is 
significantly increasing for 
MO in the  (0-5%) range 
 
Han, Lee and Suk 
(1999)  
2000 firms from 
G-7 countries 
(1991-1994) 
a. Insider ownership (ratio of closely held 
shares to total number shares 
outstanding) 
b. Closely held shares (shares held by 
officers, directors, beneficial owners and 
principal stockholders) 
- Return on Equity 
- Asset Turnover 
- Net Profit Margin 
Find no evidence that firm 
performance is improved by 









 Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Author(s)  Sample and 
 Period 





435 firms in 12 
EU countries 
(1990-1995) 
a. Ownership share (votes) of the largest 
owner in percentage 
b. Dummy variable for the identity of 
largest owner for each: bank, non-
financial company, family (single 
person or foundation), government, 
institutional investors 
 
- Market to book value of 
equity (MBV) 
- Return on Assets (ROA) 
There is a positive effect of 
ownership concentration on 
performance (MBV and ROA). 
The effect of ownership 







a. Dummy variable for (a) controlling 
shareholders, (b) family ownership, (c) 
government ownership, (d) foreign 
investor (e) more than one controlling 
shareholder 
b. Dummy variable for (a) controlling 
shareholders and (b) their involvement 
in management within in the range [25-
50], [50-75], and [75-100] 
 
- Simplified Tobin’s Q 
- Sales-asset Ratio 
- Return on Assets 
Controlling shareholders is 
associated with higher 
performance. The controlling 
shareholders’ involvement in the 
management has a negative 
effect on performance. 
Family controlled firms have 




223 US firms 
(1976-1980) 
a. Percentage of shares owned by 
management 
b. Percentage of shares owned by (outside) 
five largest shareholders 
 
Tobin’s Q No significant effect of 







Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Author(s)  Sample and 
 Period 










a. Family; equity holding of lgest. Indiv 
shareholder +close family. 
b. Instrumental variables for i) family ii) 
foreign funds iii) foreign banks iv) 
domestic funds v) domestic banks. 
 
Return on capital employed 
(ROCE); Return on assets 
(ROA); earnings per share 
(EPS); sales revenue as % 
issued capital. 
 
No signif. effect family 
ownership instrumental variable 
on any performance measure; 
signif. positive influence of 
institutional investors on 4 
measures of performance; test 
for non-linearity no signif. co-
efficients. 









a. Majority control (>50%) single or tight 
group. 
b. Minority control (15-50%). 
c. Management control – dispersed 
ownership. 
ROE (rate of return on 
shareholder equity) 
 
Ratio of sales to assets. 
 
Concentrated ownership has a 
positive impact on profitability 
and operational efficiency. 
 
Cho and Kim 
(2007) 
347 Korean 
listed cos. In 
1999. 
 
a. large shareholder ownership 0-5 
                                                     5-25 
                                                    25-100% 
b. blockholder ownership; 
c. managerial ownership. 
Ratio of profit to total 
assets (ROA). 
 
Large shareholders have a 
positive influence on corporate 
performance. 
 





723 firm years, 
1995-2002. 
 
a. Board shareholding as % total 
shareholding. 
b. Institutional shareholding as % total 
shareholding. 
 
Market -to-book value of 
equity. 
 
Significant negative reln. 
between board shareholding and 
performance; supports non-
linear relationship; 
Significant negative reln. 
Between institutional 
shareholding and performance; 
Model 2 suggest ownership and 






Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Author(s)  Sample and 
 Period 









a. fraction of  all shares held by 
owners with minimum of 5% 
shareholding; 
b. fraction of all shares held by firm’s 
management owning a minimum 




Accounting profit rate. 
 
More concentrated ownership 
structure positively related to 
higher firm profitability; 
Profitability a positive predictor 
of ownership structure 
indicating endogeneity of 
ownership structure. 
 
Braun and Sharma 
(2007) 
 
USA; 84 listed 
family firms. 
 
Family controls at least 10% of voting 
rights. 
 
Buy and hold market – 
adjusted returns. 
 
Firm performance is negatively 
related to rising ownership when  








a. % equity largest owner; 
b. % equity 5largest owner. 
 
       c. % votes controlled, lgest. Owner, 
       d. % votes controlled, 5lgest. Owner 
 
       e.% equity controlled, foreign owner 
       f.. % votes controlled. Foreign owner. 
Marginal q; ( measure of 
marginal performance 
rather than average 
performance as Tobins Q) 
Significant negative relationship 
between concentrated ownership 
and investment performance; 
Significant and negative 
relationship between vote-
differential and firm investment 
performance 
 
                                
 
 Source: Authors’ compilation  
The studies on the ownership-performance relationship that came after the Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) critique focus on the fraction of shares owned by a firm’s 
management. In regard to this issue Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p.214) argue that 
‘exclusive reliance on this measure to track the severity of the agency problems 
suggests that all shareholders classified as management have a common interest. This 
is not likely to be true’. These writers provide the example of a board member who 
has a position because he/she has, or represents someone who has large holdings of 
the company’s stock. They argue that this type of board is likely not to have interests 
identical to those of professional managers.  
 
Prior to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), studies of this relationship used purely accounting 
profit (e.g. Kamerschen 1968; Steer and Cable 1978; Bothwell 1980). Some later 
researchers, although still utilising accounting profit, have already relied on Tobin’s Q 
as a measure of firm performance. Included among these are Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985); Holderness and Sheehan (1988); Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988); 
McConnel and Servaes (1990); and Denis and Denis (1994). Other researchers, 
including Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); McConnel and Servaes (1995); 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999); Holderness, Krozner and Sheehan (1999) 
have relied mainly on Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance in their studies. 
The issues relating to the use of the accounting profit rate and/or Tobin’s Q as a 
measure of firm’s performance has been discussed at length on page. Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003) have, as discussed earlier, proposed marginal Tobin’s Q and, along 
with Bjuggren et al. (2007), used this as their dependent variable. 
 
The majority of empirical studies in the ownership-performance relationship employ 
dummy variables to classify firms by control type (e.g. Pedersen and Thomsen 1997). 
Some of the studies (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn 1985) have utilised continuous variables 
for shareholder concentration measures. However, the use of both dummy and 
continuous variables in this relationship has implicitly assumed that ‘if there is some 
difference in performance of firms due to different ownership structures, the 
relationship is uniform’ (Short 1994).  
 
The assumption of linearity in the relationship between ownership and performance 
has been claimed as producing misleading results (Short 1994). This assumption does 
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not recognise the possibility of relationships which may exists within various ranges 
or classifications of ownership levels. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) criticised a 
study by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) which failed to find a significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and performance, on the grounds that their result 
may due to their use of a linear specification which failed to capture any existing non-
linear relationship. Cubbin and Leech (1983, 365) argued that ‘the misclassification 
resulting from the use of fixed rules [in classifying ownership category] which make 
no allowance for variation in dispersion between companies is likely to be a serious 
source of bias in cross-sectional empirical studies’. To overcome this problem, Short 
(1994) suggests the need for more complex and finer ownership classifications to be 
defined, using several different cut-off points.  
 
The identity of large shareholders is perceived to be another important aspect in the 
study of the ownership-performance relationship (Short 1994). McConnel and Servaes 
(1990), Li et al. (2006) suggest that some block shareholders might be more passive 
investors whilst others may play a more active monitoring role. It was suggested, 
therefore, that differences in the identity of large shareholders should be further 
investigated to discover the level of ownership at which shareholders find it profitable 
to exercise close monitoring processes. According to Short (1994, 223) this process is 
reasonable ‘rather than simply defining shareholders as being large if they own more 
than some arbitrary percentage of equity’. 
 
Conclusion 
This discussion highlights a number of issues associated with empirical research on 
the effect of ownership and control structure on firm performance. The main area of 
contention within this relationship is that of ‘defining variables that empirically 
capture the notion of control’ (Short 1994, 227). Studies by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) and McConnel and Servaes (1990) could be seen as an important 
contribution in this area as both studies consider the possibility of non-linear 
relationship between ownership and performance. Moreover, both of these studies and 
those of Holderness and Sheehan (1988) have also pioneered the use of Tobin’s Q as 
an alternative measure of performance within the ownership and performance 
relationship. Marginal Tobin’s Q has been added to the array of performance 




There has been very limited research into the relationship between measures of corporate 
performance and ownership structure in countries such as those of East Asia. The results 
generated by the studies using a range of ownership and a range of performance 
measures and summarised in Table 1 remain inconclusive on whether the type of 
ownership structure does significantly affect performance within the jurisdictions 
studied. The theory suggests that the results from economies with strong investor 
protection regimes and legal enforcement may not be directly applicable to economies 
where investor protection and legal enforcement are weak. The studies identified from 
East Asia are, however, similarly inconclusive at this point.  
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